As Bogardus goes on to discuss, various feminist philosophers have recommended newfangled gender-definitions of manhood and womanhood to resist the idea that “biology is destiny,” or that all of a person’s features are due to their biological traits. Bogardus constructs the following argument that they may have in mind:
- If women are adult female humans – if, that is, women are purely biological entities – then biological determinism is true with respect to women: a woman’s social, psychological, and behavioral traits are inevitable, being determined by her biological states.
- Biological determinism with respect to women in false.
- So, women are not adult, female humans.
Bogardus digs deep to try to find a motivation for 1, but in the end, it doesn’t seem true. Bogardus remarks,
. . . I think we can all still agree that a lioness is simply an adult female lion. . . . Should we conclude that a lioness’s social, psychological, and behavioral traits are completely determined by her biological states . . . Wouldn’t we still have to actually check?
Section 1.2
Some, however, aren’t offering this sort of argument, but are only urging “that it’s inappropriate, immoral, or imprudent to say that” women are adult female humans. But as Borgardus points out, this is irrelevant to the truth of the matter.
Bogardus concludes,
The sex/gender distinction is simply not required to resist biological determinism. Indeed, it’s hard to see how it even helps.
Section 1.2
One, he points out, can resist biological determinism on perfectly general grounds, grounds which are compatible with a traditional understanding of manhood and womanhood. So such resistance gives us to reason at all to agree that manhood and womanhood are gender-concepts which are not based on sex.
