In this section of his paper Bogardus evaluates the following argument, which seems to be given in a 2012 article by feminist philosopher Jennifer Saul:
- If “man” and “woman” are sex terms [i.e. defined at least in part in terms of biological sex], then any adult human is either clearly a man or clearly a woman and not both.
- But some adult intersex people are neither clearly men nor clearly women.
- Therefore, “man” and “woman” are not sex terms. (Section 1.3, slightly reformatted)
One might doubt premise 2, but note the word “clearly” – we should probably grant 2, even though most with so-called “intersex” conditions would assure us that they are either a man, or a woman, and not both.
Instead, Bogardus targets premise 1, which on reflection is not plausible at all. As he observes,
An astonishing number of our concepts allow for borderline cases . . . perhaps woman and man are defined partly in terms of sex, and perhaps that’s partly why those terms allow for borderline cases. After all, many biological concepts allow for borderline cases. Like the central biological concept life, for example. Think of viruses, or prions. And also fish (think lungfish), eye (think eye-spots), etc. So, if a woman is an adult female human, it should be no surprise that [the concept] woman allows for borderline cases. . . . But why think this vagueness is a problem? Biology is shot through with vagueness, after all. There’s no way around it.
Bogardus, “Evaluating Arguments for the Sex/Gender Distinction,” Section 1.3
Further, any new-fangled gender concept, meant to replace a sex-based one, is going to be more vague. Remember the activists’ slogan that “gender is a spectrum.” Bogardus remarks,
So if vagueness is a cost, gender revisionism has a higher price tag than do the traditional definitions of [the concepts] man and woman. We have here, then, no reason to reject the traditional definitions.
Section 1.3
Another popular argument against the traditional concepts that seems upon examination to count for nothing.
